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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
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PERSONAL - INFORMAL
SECRET

American Embassy, /
Moscow,
March 30, 1959.

Dear Ljvie:

Many thanks for your prompt reply to my letter. I have just telegraphed the Soviet acceptance of our proposals for the FM meeting and it looks as though the show will soon be on the road. In view of your letter we are now planning to go home after the summit meeting. I shall probably take Jane and the family out to Frankfurt with me and send them ahead by boat and plan to join them as soon as the summit is over. If I am included on the FM delegation I shall probably also take Jane with me and hope you bring Betty along too. I'm sure you realize I have no particular feeling about being present at this particular retrace but would of course be glad to come if this is desired. It seems quite clear that Soviet policy is directed toward getting to the summit at almost any cost, but I can't for the life of me imagine what Khrushchev has up his sleeve unless it is some radical proposal on disarmament.

I have just had a quick look at the Working Group report and will probably send you a message on it as soon as I have had time to study it further. In general since it is most unlikely that there will be any serious discussion of reunification at the FM meeting I think we should dress up our proposals more for public presentation.

While I am on the subject of reunification I should like to elaborate on one of my messages in which I suggested that a distinction might be made between German withdrawal from NATO and continued German participation in all other European integration efforts. It seems generally assumed that the withdrawal of Germany from NATO would mean the complete neutrality of Germany. I do not think this should necessarily be the case and this is something we surely should not accept. We could, it seems to me, envisage a situation in which Germany would have a status similar to Austria but without any commitment of any kind toward neutrality except membership in foreign alliances and foreign bases on German territory. Of course the Soviets would not like such a proposition but

The Honorable
Livingston T. Merchant,
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I do not think Khrushchev could ever persuade his military to go along with an agreement which left Germany in NATO. I am not advocating, at least at present, that it would be wise to agree to German withdrawal from NATO, although I think we might eventually consider this if missile developments go on apace and if the French continue to be French and make NATO almost unworkable. As we know, the withdrawal of any of the satellites from the Warsaw Pact would mean nothing, but I am inclined to think that so far as *of their withdrawal from Nato* Germany itself is concerned the same thing would be true. The Germans have had such a dose of the Communists and the Russians through occupation, as prisoners of war, etc., that I can't help but believe the Germans would always be on our side and would never attempt to make a deal with the Soviets. I realize of course that German withdrawal from NATO would have a profound if not devastating effect on that organization.

All the best.

Sincerely,

Tommy
Llewellyn E. Thompson

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